Friday, March 31, 2006

Historical Belief/Religious Belief

Wittgenstein says:
"Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) narrative and says: now believe! But not, believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather: believe, through think and thin, which you can do only as a result of a life. Here you have a narrative, don't take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite different place in your life for it.- There is nothing paradoxical about that!" (Culture and Value, 32e)

Does belief encounter a 'historical truth' in the same way it encounters an everyday truth (like, the garbage truck comes on Tuesday)? Wittgenstein seems to be saying the encounter is very similar, insofar as it is only a result of 'a life'. But what's 'a life'? Elsewhere he says, "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? -In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? -Or is the use its life?" (PI, 432). This is a fascinating idea: a narrative is 'true' in its use- the 'way' it is used, the place where it is heard, spoken. The historian reads the inconsistent gospels, and says, 'ah, one of these accounts must be false, because they couldn't all have happened.' But St. Irenaeus of Lyon reads four gospels that indicate the four zones of the world (east/west, north/south), and thought four manifested everything about Jesus, 'breathing out immortality on every side.'
This doesn't deal with any type of "objectivism" as such, and that's probably not in Wittgenstein's concern. Really, what is the point of such "objectivism"? Most likely it is to give your reasons for action justification to others, but the only people who would care are those who already somehow hold your poistion (or life, as it were).

The question to me is this: how much is "given" to us (where we don't partake in the forming) and how much do we (consciously or not) form this life? It's this dialectic (if it is a dialectic) that's fascinating.