Monday, July 02, 2007

The necessity of waste.

Bataille once said, "humanity recognizes the right to acquire, conserve, and to consume rationally, but it excludes in principle nonproductive expernditure." Today, my wife was attempting to put Microsoft XP on her new Mac, the software she acquired with the purchase of her last computer. She called about the "product key", and asked if it was alright to "roll over" the software from her last computer. The service associate said, "the software lives and dies with the computer itself."

Now think about this. Software, which by definition "floats" around, above and through hardware, something like a word floats around the definition the dictionary gives it, lasts longer than hardware, if one chooses to use it. Software requires an agent to initialize it, to give it body and form. It needs hardware in order to be used, but of course, this hardware can be any old machine. The software-machine is the tide of the ebb and flow of the sea, needing any old beach in order to bring down its white, frothy caps.

But Microsoft, in our wonderful capitalistic system, is much more concern about money than about products themselves. The products are merely means to an end, an end which is an abstract thing, the almighty dollar. This dollar can be exchanged for other things, things one needs or wants. Yet what would be the best way in order to procure said money? The creation of waste.

Yes, waste is one of the most essential categories in our economy, because without sufficient waste, money would be impossible. You see, waste allows for expansion, and expansion is the only way for money to grow, and for capitalist exchange to be possible. Waste is the silent partner in the growth of our social machine.

Hegel points this out well. In his discussions of poverty in his Philosophy or Right, he tries to help us understand just how the wealth of a society is directly related to its poverty in capitalist societies. You see, there is something of a dilemma when it comes to what to do with the poor. If you support them (in charity), you immediately devalue their humanity, because they would be dependent on the wealthy. We can see how the English poor laws helped both deal with poverty, while at the same time create a group of people who did not see themselves as equals to the wealthy, and conversely, the wealthy believed themselves superior to the poor. On the other hand, if you helped provide work for them, there would be too much production. Hegel puts it like this: "it is precisely in overproduction that the lack of a proporitionate number of consumers who are themselves productive that the evil consists, and this is merely exacerbated by the two expedients in question. This shows that, despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not wealthy enough - it.e., its own distinct resources are not sufficient - to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble [i.e., the poor]."

What is the way out of this capitalist dilemma? I mean, needing a group of people to be poor in order to stop overproduction is pretty harsh, don't you think? One small solution is waste: don't worry about overproduction, because what you produce shall last for such a limited amount of time, and so the consumer will continually consume. Admittedly, this does not solve the full problem; if we had zero unemployment in this country, overproduction would be rampant, and everyone would suffer. Instead, if we displace the "lack" here from people to things, we can still be capitalists and have our cake too.

What is the consequence of making waste necessary to the growth and survival of a system? Especially when so little can be recycled, it seems to me, at least, there is no incentive to treat our world like a place that should be sustained. Eventually, waste creates a desert.

Sunday, July 01, 2007

Belief, the mighty State, the new Priests

"Scientific knowledge as nonbelief is truly the last refuge of belief, and as Nietzsche put it, there never was but one psychology, that of the priest" (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 111).

This point makes me think about Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens. All four have had books out in the last couple of years about the delusion, danger, and absurdity of religion, arguing that a much better explanation can be provided by evolutionary biology and other sciences as to how the world works.
I must admit, I haven't quite been able to stomach all their writing quite yet. I've read snippets, here and there (introductions, various chapters, etc.). For instance, I was reading about one of Richard Dawkins pet peeves, which is calling a child a "Catholic" child, or a "Muslim" child. Why would you do something so stupid, Dawkins asks us - they haven't had a chance to know whether or not they believe in God! They haven't made the decision, haven't justified their belief, so no one is justified in calling them by any religious appellation.
This is pretty representative of these thinkers and their analysis (although, one might say Dennett probably the least of these). For these thinkers, religion turns on the problem of belief, and more specifically, belief construed as what philosophers call "correspondence." What this means is that belief is understand as an equation or identification between what someone thinks, and the "state of the things."
The mighty State, yes indeed. If I believe the world is round, well well, science has the proof that the "state of things" is in my corner, like a boxing coach encouraging me in a ten rounder with Mr. Truth. Mr. Truth will not get the best of me, because my concept, my idea of the world, is in accordance with that "objective" thing we call the world. "Science" can help, using its particular method, and with its particular communities' approval. If I can provide evidence that the state of things and is the same as what I think, then I have a "justification" for what I think, and this would be a legitimate belief.
Now, what's wrong with this picture in regards religion? Heck, what's wrong with this picture in regards everyday life? In my mind, something very basic: no one actually lives their life justifying their beliefs. I suppose everyone has "moments" where they do, but in actual fact, religious people certainly don't, and neither do scientist (except regards their work). How many scientist have you ever met who asked whether or not one needs science? It's assumed that the veil should be torn from Isis, and nature should be rent and analyzed for "knowledge's sake." Religion on its part is not so much about belief as about communities (hence the root, re-ligere, meaning to "bind together," used for the old Roman door hinges) and practices, and in general, religious people actually view themselves in relation to these, rather than in relation to "belief."
First of all, communities are essential to most religions because, as Aristotle said, humans are political animals, and empirically, communities have enabled people to form associations which in some way provide for them. In the first century of our era, for instance, the Hellenistic world was full of communities for religious purposes. These communities created space for collective action (in any number of ways) that couldn't be found in other channels within the repressive Roman empire (for instance, wealthy women, who's political positions were devalued, helped finance many religious movements, including one famous missionary, St. Paul).
More basic, religions are defined by their practices, not so much by their beliefs. This is why Dawkins is completely wrong to require a "decision" on the part of children about their beliefs (one might even say this shows that Dawkins is the product of a Protestant environment). Religions are not generally about "belief", but about practices that help form certain types of persons. All religions are concerned with the formation of a certain type of person, and they do this in a number of ways. Muslims, for instance, require prayer five times a day. The physicality of this prayer, with the bend to the knees, bend to the floor, and then prostration, does more than just "symbolically" represent a person's dependence on God. Through physical practice one feels dependence, one works at subordination in one's own muscles. We can reflect and say that this represents the "Muslim" (i.e., one who submits to God), but for a Muslim, this is a practice and discipline of the body, before it is a "representation" of anything.
One can also see how focus on belief distorts how religious people understand why they are religious. The argument from people like Sam Harris, Hitchens, or Dawkins, is that evolution explains the world much better, and that religion misrepresents the origins of the world. Yet, the only people who actually care about "explanations" for the world are either scientists or creationists (who, by the way, are perfect caricatures for evolutionary thinkers to sink their teeth into). The "origins" of the world don't really have any cash value when you are a poor Ecuadorian farmer struggling to survive, or a single mother with no support network working two jobs. These are the kinds of questions most important to religions (although many counter-examples can be provided, no doubt), and when you just get down to it, not that many people care about origins. They mostly care about their friend they attend church with, the discussions they have about their sufferings and their triumphs, and the joy in hearing Psalms that have meant consolation in struggling times. Explanations are good for professors who make their livings trying to show their professions they are exceptional, but for everyone else, they really don't do a lot.
This all brings me back to the quote I started with. These atheists are actually rather bland and trite in their condemnations of religion, because they are the other side of the religious coin. They high-priest is no longer the pope or Billy Graham, but the evolutionary biologist, or the neurobiologist. They are the courts who declare this or that individual's experience as delusional, or this or that argument 'absurd according to the data science now has.' Nietzsche was right about them.

from "Voyages"

-And yet this great wink of eternity,
Of rimless floods, unfettered leewardings,
Samite sheeted and processioned where
Her undinal vast belly moonward bends,
Laughing the wrapt inflections of our love...

Hart Crane, from "Voyages"