Look and see: Why does Wittgenstein discuss philosophy as a task of 'look and see'? In his discussion of "ostensive definition" that carries over from the first 30 sections, Wittgenstein notices that often there is a serious problem with the word "this." If one considers language as a collection of "names" that point to an "object" (logical atomism, as it were), the word 'this' - which is the "most" ostensive word you can think of - starts to seem like "the only genuine name." But of course how could it be? There is no one definite object "this" points to, and hence it is always in need of a supplemental definition.
Wittgenstein thinks that in this entire discussion there is a certain "subliming" of our language. He says, about "this" being the only genuine name, "this queer conception springs from a tendency to sublime [sublimieren] the logic of our language" (§38). This verb should be better translated "sublimate," as in the chemical process of a solid turning into a gas - not the "sublime" in the 19th century sense, i.e. that thing - like an abyss - that reaches the limits of our language, and extends beyond them. Sublime in that sense is a bit too dramatic. Instead, Wittgenstein is trying to point out that philosophers, whenever they have a hard time with fitting a particular thing (like the word "this") into a certain way of thinking (such as "ostensive definition") - when language "goes on holiday" as he says - they resort to "subliming" this language, i.e. making something concrete and ordinary into a much more serious affair.
It is in this context that W. launches a more detailed discussion of "naming," and repeats what he said earlier in §49, when he says that "naming is so far not a move in the language-game" (see my last post). It culminates in a discussion of broom-sticks. The question is whether if I say my broomstick is in the corner, is it a more "fundamental" analysis to say that in the corner is a broom-handle with a brush on it, or a broomstick? In other words, does analysis give us something better than just plain old "broomstick." And if I said, 'bring me the broomstick with the brush which it is fitted on to it' wouldn't I answer "Do you want the broom? Why do you put it so oddly" (§60)? The point here is that what matters is the use of language in the language game, and so no, the analysis of the broomstick into stick and brush is not better at all, its just a different language game.
And then Wittgenstein anticipates an objection - and here we get what he means with the phrase 'look and see.' The objection might be 'but what is the essence of a language-game?' "You take the easy way out" one might say, "you talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of language, is" (§65). W.'s rejoinder is that phenomena are related to each other in many different ways. If we're interested in an "essence", or what is at least in "common," we have to "look and see whether there is anything in common to them all" (§66). This is essential to how W. sees language, because as his next analysis of the concept of "game" shows, there are many similarities between football and handball (and other such games), but many differences as well.
Family Resemblances. But if one must 'look and see' to understand a concept such as "game" and the relationships between the many different types of games, what is one looking at? W. says here that he "can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances'" (§67). E.g., if we think about the concept of number, we get things like cardinal numbers, rational numbers, etc., and they all have similarities to each other, and also differences. Does that mean there is a single "essence?" No. Instead, W. uses the metaphor of a thread: "we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fiber on fiber. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fiber runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibers" (§67).
But what does this mean for our conception of things like games? It means that in a certain measure, there is no boundary to concepts like this. There is as much difference between basketball and solitare as there is similarity, but we would be hard pressed to say that the one is or the other isn't. Now, this does not mean you cannot "draw" a boundary, but it does mean we don't need a boundary in order to use the concept (§68).
This notion of not having sharp boundaries to our concepts certainly does not feed into the physics envy of philosophers (although I'm not sure how many philosophers still feel this - according to Rorty, it's more the scientists who now have "philosopher-envy"), because it means that one's concepts are not, in themselves, all that exact. But for W., it does not matter, because the point of "defining" something is secondary to what we are doing with it. In other words, if one is to point to a certain conceptual space, the issue is not how clearly it is demarcated, but rather how this space is employed (§71). When we look at what is common in things we are trying to show how this conceptual space is used in similar ways, not how this conceptual space "is" ontologically.
Now, the philosopher in me is quite uncomfortable with W.'s project. In a certain sense, I would not want to give up all ontological claims. What about claims to justice and a vision of a new world? Would these be accommodated if the point was to "look and see?" The notion of an ideal can be quite critical of the present age, and hence progressive, while focusing all one's attention on the thing in front of you can be quite opposite. Of course, it is still too early in my reading to really know how W.'s project might affect this, and so I guess I will look and see.
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