Thursday, March 12, 2009

Arguments - In and Out of Science

I've just started what I hope will be a really good refresher for me on current science by the New York Times science correspondent, Natalie Angier (The Canon). So far it's pretty interesting, and I'm really excited to learn a bit about new experiments going on, and her writing style, while a bit verbose, is in general really good. 

One thing really annoys me though. Her first chapter is about the scientific "critical thinking" mindset. It is important to start here, because as she points out (and many scientists say), science is not about a set of facts, but about a way of thinking. This is different from other ways of thinking, called "opinion." This of course is a distinction that goes back to Plato, but in her book seems to make this distinction between science and all other types of thinking. E.g., she quotes Andrew Knoll of Harvard: 
"In politics, you can say, I like George Bush, or I don't like George Bush, or I do or don't like Howard Dean or John Kerry or Mr. Magoo... You don't need a principled reason for that political opinion. You don't need evidence that someone else can replicate to justify your opinion. You don't need to think of alternative explanations that would render your opinion invalid..." 
Of course, after this, science comes in with its methods of control and institutional checks and balances, peer review, etc. She then has a few pages on the way science is critical of itself, which culminates in a few pages about the uncertainty of science. Uncertainty is one of the most important aspects of science, because its precisely in uncertainty there is a motivation for searching and working and discovering (incidentely, this is also one of Plato's contributions: the philosopher is precisely that person who desires wisdom, but does not have it, and thus is continually impelled toward it). I would say kudos - the best theories out there are ones that have just a enough certainty to keep working them out, but not enough to shut down debate. Those are normally the most productive theories.

The problem, she and some scientists say, is that this creates a poor public image. "How do you convey the need for uncertainty in science, the crucial role it plays in nudging research forward and keeping standards high, without undermining its credibility?" This is an excellent question, but the real issue has nothing to do with science's uncertainty, but with people's standard for argumentation. If you consider argument to be either mere opinion, or scientific, then you're setting up a false dichotomy. 

In other words, if you go around saying there are two ways of thinking - "critical scientific" thinking and "opinions" that supposedly do not need "evidence" - then you'll always have this problem. Andrew Knoll is just plain wrong that we do not need to justify our views. "Critical scientific" thinking is a species of the "critical thinking" genus. The Greek word krinein, from which we derive "critical," means to divide or cut (our word decision comes from the Latin synonym, caedere), and this is exactly what we do with "critical" thinking: we separate out good reasons from bad, cut certain perspectives while keeping others (winnow, if you like). This is a process that is much broader than modern institutionalized science. It happens in the everyday (should I go to this store or that?), and ought to happen whenever we think politically and in communities (where, sadly, it does not often occur). We separate this from that based on communal standards, principles we hope are true, and a whole bunch of cultural history and knowledge gained through thousands of years of experience as humans. 

The solution to this PR problem is merely to note what science can and cannot do, and what political argument should but does not do. Scientific findings are a basis to make reasoned arguments about what one ought to do. They are not idols we must serve in order to appease the gods of modern style, because ultimately that merely shifts responsibility to an impersonal jumble of information instead of to actual people (like you and me, and our nation's leaders), who have to do the real work of decision. Science ought to keep its standards high, to attain the most certainty it can; then politicians and thinkers, citizens and individuals, must take responsibility for their actions in the light of how they see their lives playing out. The questions "how ought we to be in our world" is clearly helped by critical scientific thinking (although it is not always helped by science in general - atom bomb anyone?), but it is not the whole of that question.

Ultimately what really irks me about both scientific rhetoric on this point, and about people's annoyance at science's uncertainty, is that both seem to have an attitude that one must find authority somewhere else. 

'You can't argue for your opinion, because it's just opinion! You don't have the scientific method to back you up!'  

'We can't trust you scientists, because you guys get it wrong!'

Apparently I have been under the illusion that that little Enlightenment dicta, "think for yourself!" still applies. 

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